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Passive-Voice References in Statutory 
Interpretation* 
Anita S. Krishnakumar† 
INTRODUCTION 
The Supreme Court regularly references grammar rules 
when interpreting statutory language. And yet grammar 
references play a peculiar role in the Court’s statutory cases—
often lurking in the background and performing corroborative 
work to support a construction arrived at primarily through 
other interpretive tools. The inevitable legisprudential1 
question triggered by such references is, why does the Court 
bother? If grammar rules provide merely a second, third, or 
fourth justification for an interpretation reached through other 
interpretive canons, then what does the Court gain—or think it 
gains—by including such rules in its statutory analysis?  
This essay examines these questions through the lens of 
a little-noticed grammar reference that has reared its head in a 
handful of Supreme Court cases: inferences based on a 
statute’s use of the passive voice. The essay argues that the 
Supreme Court’s framing of passive-voice arguments suggests 
both legitimating and harmonizing roles for grammar 
references in statutory interpretation. Larry Solan has argued 
that judges employ linguistic analysis in statutory 
interpretation because they are under pressure to write 
decisively and to limit what they say to certain acceptable 
argument forms.2 Linguistic arguments, Solan theorizes, lend a 
(false) sense of neutrality and inevitability to a court’s 
  
 * © 2011 Anita S. Krishnakumar. All rights reserved. 
 † Associate Professor, St. John’s University School of Law. J.D., Yale Law 
School, 1999; A.B., with distinction, Stanford University, 1996. 
 1 The term “legisprudence” refers to “the jurisprudence of legislation,” as 
described by Bill Eskridge. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism, 37 UCLA 
L. REV. 621, 624 (1990); John L. Flynn, Mixed-Motive Causation Under the ADA: Linked 
Statutes, Fuzzy Thinking, and Clear Statements, 83 GEO. L.J. 2009, 2012 (1995); Abbe R. 
Gluck, The States as Laboratories of Statutory Interpretation: Methodological Consensus 
and the New Modified Textualism, 119 YALE L.J. 1750, 1762 n.32 (2010). 
 2 LAWRENCE M. SOLAN, THE LANGUAGE OF JUDGES 9, 174 (1993). 
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statutory reading—making it seem as if the court had no choice 
but to construe the statute in the selected manner.3 The Court’s 
passive-voice-based linguistic arguments provide some support 
for Solan’s theory. But I submit that there is more to the 
Court’s articulation of passive-voice-based interpretive 
inferences than the legitimation of its statutory constructions. 
This essay argues that the Court also uses passive-voice 
references to promote horizontal coherence across the United 
States Code. That is, when the Court announces particular 
interpretive inferences that flow from a statute’s use of the 
passive voice and other grammar devices, it not only justifies 
its interpretation of the statute at issue but also constructs 
consistency of meaning across federal statutes.  
Elsewhere, I have posited that several members of the 
Court are motivated by a methodological preference for 
ensuring coherence across the legal landscape when construing 
statutes.4 In line with this preference, when the Court derives 
specific consequences from a statute’s grammatical choices, it 
does not merely apply well-worn rules to the statute at hand; it 
also engages in a subtle project of constructing coherence 
across the legal landscape⎯creating, in effect, a judicially 
prescribed federal code of grammatical meaning.  
I. THE PASSIVE-VOICE CASES 
To date, six Supreme Court cases, decided between 1977 
and 2009, have referenced a statute’s use of the passive voice to 
determine the statute’s meaning.5 Most of these cases have 
involved criminal statutes,6 and four have referenced the 
passive voice only to observe that it leaves the statute’s 
meaning indeterminate.7 Opinions in two of the cases have read 
  
 3 Id. at 4, 45. 
 4 See generally Anita S. Krishnakumar, Statutory Interpretation in the Roberts 
Court’s First Era: An Empirical and Doctrinal Analysis, 62 HASTINGS L.J. 221 (2010). 
 5 See Dean v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 1849, 1853 (2009); Watson v. United 
States, 552 U.S. 74, 81 (2007); Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227, 259 (1999) 
(Kennedy, J., dissenting); United States v. Wilson, 503 U.S. 329, 332-33 (1992); id. at 
341, 343 (Stevens, J., dissenting); Gladstone, Realtors v. Vill. of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 
102-03 (1979); E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Train, 430 U.S. 112, 128-29 (1977). 
 6 See Dean, 129 S. Ct. at 1853; Watson, 552 U.S. at 81; Jones, 526 U.S. at 
259 (Kennedy, J., dissenting); Wilson, 503 U.S. at 332-33; id. at 341, 343 (Stevens, J., 
dissenting). 
 7 See Watson, 552 U.S. at 81; Wilson, 503 U.S. at 332-33; id. at 341, 343 
(Stevens, J., dissenting); Gladstone, Realtors, 441 U.S. at 102-03; E. I. du Pont de 
Nemours, 430 U.S. at 128-29. 
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something significant into Congress’s decision to employ the 
passive voice in a statutory phrase.8 This part reviews all six 
cases, focusing on the latter two in which the Court placed 
noteworthy weight on a statute’s use of the passive voice.  
A. The Passive Voice as Indeterminate 
There is nothing remarkable about the Court’s passive-
voice references in the first four cases. In each case, the Court 
merely acknowledged that the passive voice obscured the 
identity of the statutory actor who was authorized or deemed to 
take the action described in the provision. In Watson v. United 
States, for example, the Court noted that the statute’s use of 
the passive voice made it unclear whether a person who trades 
drugs for a gun “uses” a gun within the meaning of the statute.9 
The passive voice played a similar role in Gladstone, Realtors v. 
Village of Bellwood, where the Court held that because Title 
VIII used the passive voice in authorizing civil actions for 
violations of the statute, the statute placed “no particular 
statutory restrictions on potential plaintiffs” entitled to bring 
enforcement suits.10 Likewise, in E. I. du Pont de Nemours & 
Co. v. Train, the Court found that a section of the Federal 
Water Pollution Control Act, which used the passive voice in 
describing effluent limitations, was unclear as to whether the 
administrator or the permit issuer⎯that is, which actor⎯was 
supposed to establish the limitations.11 Last, in United States v. 
Wilson, both the majority and dissenting opinions observed 
that a Sentencing Reform Act provision written in the passive 
voice “created doubt”12 and “failed to identify” which decision 
maker⎯the attorney general or the judge⎯was to effectuate 
the sentencing credit in the provision.13 
  
 8 See Dean, 129 S. Ct. at 1853; Jones, 526 U.S. at 259 (Kennedy, J., 
dissenting). 
 9 Watson, 552 U.S. at 81. The statute at issue provided a mandatory minimum 
sentence for a defendant “who, during and in relation to any crime of violence or drug 
trafficking crime . . . , uses or caries a firearm.” 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A) (2006). 
 10 Gladstone, Realtors, 441 U.S. at 103. 
 11 E. I. du Pont de Nemours, 430 U.S. at 128-29. Based on the language in the 
statute’s other sections, the Court ultimately concluded that it was the administrator 
who was to do so, but it declared the section written in the passive voice indeterminate 
on this question. Id. 
 12 Wilson, 503 U.S. at 332. 
 13 Id. at 341-42 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The majority and dissent both 
concluded, based on other considerations, that one actor should nevertheless be 
preferred over the other. Id. at 333 (majority opinion); id. at 343 (Stevens, J., 
dissenting).  
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Each of these passive-voice references comports with 
traditional grammatical understandings of the passive voice as 
a linguistic construction that focuses on the object of the 
relevant action rather than the person performing the action.14 
Taken together, these four cases stand for the uncontroversial 
presumption that a statute written in the passive voice leaves 
the identity of the relevant statutory actor indeterminate. The 
Court seems neither to do much with nor to gain much from 
this form of passive-voice reference. Rather, it simply notes 
that the passive voice creates interpretive ambiguity.  
B. The Passive Voice and Culpability 
In Dean v. United States, by contrast, the Court drew 
significant inferences from the fact that the statute was 
written in the passive voice. Specifically, the Court pointed to 
the statute’s use of the passive voice to bolster its argument 
that a firearms-enhancement provision did not require 
intentional action by the defendant.15 The statute at issue 
provided that any person who “uses,” “carries,” or “possesses” a 
firearm while committing a violent crime is subject to a 
sentencing enhancement of at least five years and at least ten 
years “if the firearm is discharged.”16 Defendant Dean carried a 
gun while robbing a bank; as he was collecting money from a 
teller’s drawer, the gun accidentally discharged.17 The statutory 
dispute was over whether the enhancement provision’s “is 
discharged” language contains a requirement that the 
defendant intend to discharge the firearm.18  
In a 7-2 opinion, the Court held that the “is discharged” 
clause does not contain an intent requirement.19 Justice 
Roberts’s opinion for the Court began with a nod to the 
statutory text, noting that the text “does not require that the 
discharge be done knowingly or intentionally, or otherwise 
contain words of limitation.”20 The opinion then launched into a 
nuanced argument about the meaning of the passive voice in 
criminal statutes:  
  
 14 See BRYAN A. GARNER, A DICTIONARY OF MODERN AMERICAN USAGE 483 (1998). 
 15 See Dean v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 1849, 1853 (2009). 
 16 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A) (2006). 
 17 Dean, 129 S. Ct. at 1852. 
 18 Id. at 1852-53. 
 19 Id. 
 20 Id. at 1853. 
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Congress’s use of the passive voice further indicates that subsection 
(iii) does not require proof of intent. The passive voice focuses on an 
event that occurs without respect to a specific actor, and therefore 
without respect to any actor’s intent or culpability. It is whether 
something happened—not how or why it happened—that matters.21 
Several interpretive moves are at work in this paragraph. First 
the Court made the uncontroversial statement that the passive 
voice focuses on the action that takes place rather than on its 
performer. From there, the Court leapt to the conclusion that a 
statute written in the passive voice is triggered any time the 
action it describes occurs—without regard to the intent or 
culpability of any actor, and without regard to whether any 
actor actually has committed the described action.  
As support for this leap, the Court wove a thread 
connecting the grammatical form of the “is discharged” 
language in Dean with the grammatical form of the “to be 
used” language in the firearms-enhancement provision in 
Watson⎯claiming that Watson established that the passive 
voice in the phrase “to be used” reflects “agnosticism . . . about 
who does the using.”22 This statement, of course, was a slight 
recharacterization of Watson, which held merely that the 
passive voice in the phrase “to be used” left unclear whether 
the statute applied to a person who trades drugs for a gun.23 
Thus, the Dean Court did not simply apply an established 
grammar rule to a statute; it (re)defined the statutory 
consequences of the legislature’s use of the passive voice based 
on its own prior construction of that grammatical device.  
Why did the Court bother with this less-than-
straightforward argument about the passive voice? One can 
only speculate, but the Court’s passive-voice reference in Dean 
appears to have accomplished two things. First, it acted as a 
linguistic trump card, corroborating and lending an air of 
neutrality to the Court’s reading of the statute. Second, it 
promoted horizontal, landscape coherence by articulating a 
conventional statutory meaning for passive-voice usage across 
statutes and cases. That is, it created a sort of common-law, 
judicially prescribed rule about what a statute’s use of the 
  
 21 Id. (emphasis added) (citations omitted). 
 22 Id. (emphasis added). 
 23 Watson v. United States, 552 U.S. 74, 81 (2007) (“[T]he utility of 
§ 924(d)(1) is limited by its generality and its passive voice; it tells us a gun can be 
‘used’ in a receipt crime, but not whether both parties to a transfer use the gun, or only 
one, or which one.”). 
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passive voice means. Going forward, the Court’s decisions in 
Dean and Watson establish a linguistic presumption that a 
statute that uses the passive voice contains no intent or 
culpability requirement⎯at least in the case of firearms-
enhancement provisions24 and perhaps in the case of all 
criminal statutes. This is so despite the fact that the passive-
voice argument performed only corroborative work in Dean and 
Watson; because the Court’s statements about the interpretive 
consequences of the passive voice are not statute-specific, 
subsequent courts will be hard-pressed to give a contrary 
meaning to other criminal statutes written in the passive voice.  
C. The Passive Voice and Sentencing Factors 
In Jones v. United States, Justice Kennedy’s dissenting 
opinion similarly relied on a statute’s use of the passive voice to 
draw definitive inferences about the statute’s meaning.25 Jones 
involved the construction of the federal carjacking statute, 18 
U.S.C. § 2119, which reads as follows: 
Whoever, possessing a firearm as defined in section 921 of this title, 
takes a motor vehicle . . . from the person or presence of another by 
force and violence or by intimidation, or attempts to do so, shall— 
(1) be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 15 years, or both, 
(2) if serious bodily injury (as defined in section 1365 of this title) 
results, be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 25 
years, or both, and 
(3) if death results, be fined under this title or imprisoned for any 
number of years up to life, or both.26 
Defendant Jones had participated in a carjacking with two 
other men.27 While Jones and one of the other men held up the 
victims, the third man stuck his gun in one of the victims’ ears 
and later struck that victim on the head, causing serious 
injury.28 The issue was whether the statute’s numbered 
  
 24 See, e.g., United States v. Lora-Pena, 375 F. App’x 242, 246-47 (3d Cir. 
2010) (citing Dean, 129 S. Ct. at 1853, to conclude that a Sentencing Guideline 
requiring “a five-level increase in offense level if ‘a firearm was discharged’ . . . does not 
distinguish between accidental and purposeful discharges, and does not require a 
finding that defendant pulled the trigger”). 
 25 Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227, 259 (1999) (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
 26 18 U.S.C. § 2119 (1988) (amended 1994 & 1996). 
 27 Jones, 526 U.S. at 229-31. 
 28 Id. 
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subclauses were sentencing provisions—specifying escalating 
punishments for the offense set forth in the first paragraph—or 
whether they instead constituted three separate offenses.29 
In a 5-4 opinion, the Court concluded that “the fairest 
reading” of the statute was to treat the serious-bodily-harm 
provision as an element of a separate offense rather than as a 
mere sentencing enhancement.30 Justice Kennedy, joined by 
three other dissenters, disagreed. The dissenting opinion relied 
significantly on the structure of the statute31 but also 
emphasized the statute’s use of the passive voice:  
[T]here is some significance in the use of the active voice in the main 
paragraph and the passive voice in clauses (2) and (3) of § 2119. In 
the more common practice, criminal statutes use the active voice to 
define prohibited conduct. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1116 (1994 ed., Supp. 
III) (“[w]hoever kills or attempts to kill”); § 2114 (“assaults,” “robs or 
attempts to rob,” “receives, possesses, conceals, or disposes”); Tex. 
Penal Code Ann. §§ 29.03(a)(1), (2) (1994) (aggravated robbery; 
“causes serious bodily injury,” or “uses or exhibits a deadly weapon”); 
cf. 18 U.S.C. § 248(b) (setting forth, as sentencing factors, “if bodily 
injury results,” and “if death results”); United States Sentencing 
Commission, Guidelines Manual § 2B3.1(b)(3) (Nov. 1998) (robbery 
guideline; “[i]f any victim sustained bodily injury”).32 
Again, several interpretive moves are at work in this grammar-
based argument. First, the dissent made the authoritative 
linguistic-drafting-convention statement that “[i]n the more 
common practice, criminal statutes use the active voice to 
define prohibited conduct.”33 It then referenced several federal 
statutes, a state statute, and the United States Sentencing 
Commission Guidelines Manual to establish this drafting 
convention.34 The dissent’s passive-voice argument thus 
involved very little linguistic analysis and quite a lot of judicial 
synthesis, or landscape coherence-construction. As far as one 
  
 29 Id. at 230-32. The distinction was crucial because the indictment had not 
charged any of the facts relating to bodily injury, and the jury instructions had defined 
the elements of the government’s burden of proof with reference only to the first 
paragraph of the statute. If the second and third subclauses were deemed to be 
sentencing provisions, this would not matter, and Jones could be sentenced to twenty-five 
years based on the serious bodily injury caused to one of the victims. If, however, the 
subclauses were read as separate offense provisions containing new elements, then the 
government’s failure to plead these elements in the indictment and prove them before the 
jury would preclude it from seeking the twenty-five-year penalty against Jones. 
 30 Id. at 239. 
 31 Id. at 256 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
 32 Id. at 258-59. 
 33 Id. at 258 (emphasis added). 
 34 Id. at 258-59. 
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can tell, there was no established rule⎯linguistic, legislative, 
judicial, or otherwise⎯behind the dissent’s pronouncement. 
The dissenters seem to have constructed this drafting 
convention out of their own assessment of the other criminal 
statutes and guidelines they discovered in the surrounding 
legal landscape.  
Again, the lingering legisprudential question is, why 
bother? And again, the answer appears to be twofold: 
legitimation and horizontal coherence. Although the passive-
voice drafting convention announced by the dissent was not 
necessary to its construction of the statute, the grammar-based 
argument lent an element of detached tie-breaking to that 
construction. Faced with the close question of whether to treat 
§ 2119’s clauses as sentencing enhancements or elements of the 
offense, the grammar reference cloaked the dissent’s 
interpretation with the imprimatur of neutrality⎯presenting it 
as the product of drafting custom rather than ideological 
sympathies or a desire to reach a particular result. This is 
Larry Solan’s theory in action. But there is more than 
legitimation going on here, particularly since the dissent 
undermined the force of its drafting-convention argument by 
acknowledging, in the following paragraph, that the passive-
versus-active-voice distinctions “are not absolute rules.”35  
In addition, the dissent’s passive-voice argument also 
harmonized (or attempted to harmonize) meaning across 
criminal statutes. Like the Court’s opinion in Dean, the Jones 
dissent did not merely apply grammar rules to the carjacking 
statute as set forth in a grammar handbook. Instead, it used 
the statute’s grammatical structure as a means for threading 
various parts of the statutory framework together into a 
coherent whole.36 This brought coherence to the legal landscape 
in two ways. First, it established a presumption (and pattern) 
across existing criminal statutes that the active voice describes 
elements of an offense while the passive voice reflects 
sentencing factors.37 Second, it announced a drafting 
  
 35 Id. at 259. 
 36 See id. at 258-59; see also Dean v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 1849, 1853 
(2009) (citing comments in Watson v. United States, 552 U.S. 74, 81 (2007), regarding 
the meaning associated with a statute’s use of the passive voice). 
 37 Of course, as a practical matter, this presumption has limited force since it 
appeared in the dissent rather than the majority opinion. But I would not be surprised if 
it is invoked in the future: the Jones majority opinion relied heavily on the constitutional 
avoidance doctrine to reject reading the statute’s subclauses as additional sentencing 
factors that the prosecution was not required to plead or prove. Jones, 526 U.S. at 239-40. 
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convention, going forward, about the interpretive consequences 
of composing criminal statutes in the passive, as opposed to the 
active, voice.  
The Jones dissent illustrates that judges are drawn to 
grammar-based—or at least passive-voice-based—arguments 
even when those arguments are neither necessary to the 
statute’s construction nor particularly definitive. Part of the 
reason for this appeal is the false aura of detached decision 
making associated with linguistic analysis. But part of the 
appeal also lies in the fact that linguistic analysis provides a 
natural tool through which judges can impose external 
coherence across statutes, and can reason from statute to 
statute and from case to case.  
II. GRAMMAR REFERENCES AND HORIZONTAL COHERENCE 
This legitimation-plus-harmonization use of grammatical 
analysis is similar to the two-in-one approach that the Court 
uses when invoking the whole-act rule38 or its own prior 
interpretation of a particular word to interpret a statute.39 On 
the one hand, when the Court relies on the whole-act rule or its 
own prior interpretations, it engages in a sort of legal fiction, 
  
Perhaps the Jones dissent’s presumption will resurface in a case that distinguishes the 
Jones majority’s contrary construction on constitutional grounds. 
 38 The whole-act rule presumes internal statutory coherence—that the 
legislature drafts each statute as a structurally consistent document, both “in its use of 
language and in the way [the statute’s] provisions work together.” See WILLIAM N. 
ESKRIDGE, JR., PHILIP P. FRICKEY & ELIZABETH GARRETT, CASES AND MATERIALS ON 
LEGISLATION: STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY 862 (4th ed. 2007). 
Consistent with this underlying assumption, the whole-act rule instructs courts to 
interpret statutory provisions in a way that does not render the statute’s other 
provisions redundant or superfluous, and presumes that identical words used in 
different parts of the same statute have the same meaning. The rule also counsels that 
when the legislature includes particular language in one section of a statute but omits 
it in another, it acts deliberately and intends different meanings by the disparate 
wording. See, e.g., Keene Corp. v. United States, 508 U.S. 200, 208 (1993) (disparate 
wording); Sullivan v. Stroop, 496 U.S. 478, 484 (1990) (presumption of consistent 
meaning for identical words); Kungys v. United States, 485 U.S. 759, 778 (1988) 
(presumption against redundancy).  
 39 The Court presumes that Congress legislates against the backdrop of prior 
judicial interpretations of other statutes. Through this presumption, the Court justifies 
its reference to its own prior interpretations when giving meaning to similar words or 
phrases in a new statute. See, e.g., Antonin Scalia, Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law 
System: The Role of United States Federal Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and 
Laws, in ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE 
LAW 16-17 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997) (“Another accepted rule of construction is that 
ambiguities in a newly enacted statute are to be resolved in such fashion as to make 
the statute, not only internally consistent, but also compatible with previously enacted 
laws. We simply assume, for purposes of our search for ‘intent,’ that the enacting 
legislature was aware of all those other laws. . . . [O]f course that is a fiction . . . .”). 
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presuming that the construction it has chosen likely is the one 
Congress intended because it makes the most sense given the 
statute’s structure or the judiciary’s prior interpretation of a 
word. On the other hand, the Court is also saying that even if it 
sets aside the legal fiction that Congress is internally consistent 
and deliberate in structuring a statute or that Congress 
legislates with an awareness of the Court’s previous 
interpretations of particular words, it nevertheless is 
appropriate to employ the whole-act rule and its own prior 
interpretations to construe statutes because these interpretive 
rules help make sense of the overarching, interconnected legal 
landscape of which the statute is a part. In other words, 
irrespective of what we know about how Congress behaves when 
drafting statutes, the Court considers it part of its role as 
interpreter to bring coherence to the law and to harmonize 
various legal rules into a sensible whole—much as it would 
synthesize common-law precedents if it were working with 
common-law rules rather than with statutes. The same thing is 
happening, I think, with the Court’s passive-voice references. In 
Jones, the dissenting opinion both (1) engaged in the legal fiction 
that Congress deliberately uses the passive voice to articulate 
sentencing factors and the active voice to articulate offense 
elements; and (2) at the same time, announced that even if 
Congress did not deliberately employ this passive-versus-active-
voice distinction, the distinction is a good one—providing a 
drafting rule that makes sense of the existing legal framework—
and thus should be applied in construing the statute at issue. 
The same legal fiction plus drafting-convention announcement 
were at work in the Court’s opinion in Dean. 
In my view, then, the Court’s passive-voice-based 
grammar arguments are a little less corroborative and a little 
more constructive than they might appear at first glance. That 
is, the Court references a statute’s grammatical structure not 
because it is convinced that that grammatical structure reveals 
Congress’s true intent or that Congress focused on the particular 
meaning conveyed by its grammatical choices when drafting the 
statute. In other words, I do not think that the Court uses 
grammar references to lead it to—or to check itself against—
Congress’s actual intent. Rather, in citing the statute’s use of the 
passive voice, Justice Kennedy’s dissent in Jones seems to be 
saying that, because its statutory reading is consistent with the 
way Congress and state legislatures have drafted other criminal 
statutes, its construction should be preferred—irrespective of 
whether Congress deliberately intended that construction when 
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it chose to use the passive voice. The Court’s passive-voice 
argument in Dean is to similar effect: the Court seems to be 
stating that because its construction of the “is discharged” 
provision is consistent with its own prior construction of other 
statutory provisions using the passive voice, this construction is 
the correct one—regardless of whether Congress was aware of, 
or agreed with, the prior interpretation. The Court’s passive-
voice references, then, are about promoting continuity, external 
consistency, and drafting rules that Congress will have to follow 
in the future or will be presumed to have followed in the 
future—almost as if the Court were creating a judicial code of 
grammatical meaning. 
Finally, it is worth noting that this “aggressive” use of 
the passive voice—aggressive both in the sense that the Court 
is assigning particular meanings to a statute’s use of the 
passive voice and in the sense that the Court is using the 
passive voice to formulate a drafting convention that cuts 
across statutes—seems to be a relatively recent development in 
the Court’s jurisprudence. The Jones case was decided in 1999, 
and Dean was decided in 2009. As explained in Part I, in its 
earlier cases, the Court confined its passive-voice references to 
the unassuming recognition that a statute written in the 
passive voice left unclear the identity of the relevant statutory 
actor. Only recently has the Court sought to give more 
interpretive weight to a statute’s use of the passive voice, let 
alone to announce a particular, consistent meaning to be 
associated with the passive voice across statutes. 
CONCLUSION 
This essay seeks to shed new light on the role that 
grammar-based linguistic arguments play in the Supreme 
Court’s statutory cases, in partial answer to the question posed 
by this symposium, How much work—and what kind—does 
language do in statutory interpretation? Using the Court’s 
passive-voice-based linguistic arguments as a case study,40 the 
  
 40 Although this article focuses on the Court’s passive-voice references, a 
similar coherence-driven approach using the adjective “any” appears to exist across 
statutes. See Boyle v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 2237, 2243 (2009) (“The term ‘any’ 
ensures that the definition has a wide reach . . . .” (citing Ali v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 
552 U.S. 214, 219 (2008))); Republic of Iraq v. Beaty, 129 S. Ct. 2183, 2189 (2009) 
(“[T]he word ‘any’ . . . has an ‘expansive meaning.’” (quoting United States v. Gonzales, 
520 U.S. 1, 5 (1997))); United States v. Clintwood Elkhorn Mining Co., 553 U.S. 1, 7 
(2008) (“Five ‘any’s’ in one sentence and it begins to seem that Congress meant the 
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essay suggests that grammar references perform two 
significant roles in the Court’s construction of statutes. First, 
as Larry Solan has previously observed, grammar arguments 
seem to lend an imprimatur of neutrality to the Court’s 
interpretations. Second, like the whole-act-rule presumption 
about consistent meaning within a single statute and the 
Court’s reliance on its own prior constructions of similar words, 
grammar-based arguments provide the Court with a toolset for 
constructing consistent meaning across the federal code. 
Grammatical analysis thus appears to play an important role 
in constructing conventional statutory meaning as much as in 
corroborating it. 
  
statute to have expansive reach.”); LaRue v. DeWolff, Boberg & Assocs., 552 U.S. 248, 
261 (2008) (Thomas, J., concurring) (arguing that “any” is indiscriminate and 
provisions applying to “any losses” mean “all” losses are included (citing Ali, 552 U.S. 
at 219)); Ali, 552 U.S. at 219 (“Read naturally, the word ‘any’ has an expansive 
meaning, that is, ‘one or some indiscriminately of whatever kind.’” (quoting Gonzales, 
520 U.S. at 5)); Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 528-29 (2007) (holding that “any” 
in statutory text “embraces all airborne compounds of whatever stripe”); Lopez v. 
Gonzales, 549 U.S. 47, 61-62 (2006) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“[T]he word ‘any’ . . . has 
an ‘expansive meaning.’” (quoting Gonzales, 520 U.S. at 5)); Small v. United States, 544 
U.S. 385, 397 (2005) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (arguing that “any court” is a “broad 
phrase”). So the Court’s use of linguistic analysis to foster coherence does not appear 
limited to the passive-voice grammatical device. 
